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Murphy: Murphy: Duty of Fair Represntaion Under Taft-Hartley

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
UNDER TAFT-HARTLEY*
WILLIAM P. MuRPr**
The union's duty of fair representation had its genesis in 1944
in Steele v. LUN RR Co. 1 In that case under the Railway Labor Act
the union had negotiated with the railroad a provision which would have
eliminated certain job opportunities for Negroes. Although the Negroes
were in the bargaining unit, they were excluded from the union. The
Supreme Court held that the statute, which gave the union its power
to act as exclusive bargaining representative for all of the employees
in the unit, also imposed upon the union a corresponding duty "to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it, in behalf of all those for whom
it acts, without hostile discrimination against them." The union's power
had to be exercised "fairly, impartially, and in good faith." Although
contract variations based on "differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract" are proper, "discriminations based on race alone
are obviously irrelevant and invidious." The Court said that injunction
and award of damages were appropriate remedies for breach of the duty
of fair representation.
Steele was the first of a long line of cases involving racial discrimination among railway workers. One of the most important of these
later cases was Conley v. Gibson,2 decided in 1957. Here the Court stated
that: "The bargaining representative's duty not to draw 'irrelevant and
invidious' distinctions among those it represents does not come to an
abrupt end . . . with the making of the agreement between union and
employer. Collective bargaining is a continuing process. Among other
things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and other
working rules, resolution of new problems not covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract.
The bargaining representative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective agreement."
*Text of a paper delivered on December 11, 1964, at the 1964 Midwest
Labor Conference at Ohio State University.
**Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
1. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
2. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
(373)
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Since Section 9(a) of the NLRA also confers exclusive bargaining
power, the duty of fair representation exists also under this statute.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized this as early as 1944 in Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 3 decided the ;ame day as Steele, and it has been so held
in many subsequent cases. It has been held, out of both logic and necessity, that the duty extends not only to certified unions but also to those
enjoying bargaining power by virtue of their majority status. It has
been held in numerous lower court decisions, and recently recognized by
the Supreme Court, that racial discrimination is not the only possible
breach of the duty, but that reliance upon other "invidious and irrelevant"
factors are also within its scope. Thus, it was held in one case that
"it is not proper for a bargaining agent in representing all of his employees
to -draw distinctions among them which are based upon their political
power within the union"; 4 in another case that denial of a Coast Guard
license was improperly used as a standard; 5 in another that prior employment was an irrelevant factor," and in still others that geographical
factors were discriminatory.7 It has also been held that the union may
breach its duty by discriminating against an individual as well as against
a group of employees."
What has been said up to now would indicate that the duty of fair
representation is a potent doctrine which has afforded significant protec-:
tion to employees against the misuse of union bargaining power. It is
widely recognized, however, that the reality is to the contrary. Counterpoised to the duty is the wide latitude recognized in the union's exercise
of its power. Steele itself noted that the union is not barred from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some members of
the unit. The rationale was explicated by the Supreme Court in 1953 in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffvwn: 9
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a
delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant
considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of the
parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

323 U.S. 248 (1944).
Ferro v. Railway Express Agency, 296 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1961).
Berman v. National Maritime Union, 166 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
Hargrove v. Locomotive Engineers, 116 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1953).
Mount v. Locomotive Engineers, 226 F.2d 604 (6th Cir. 1955).
Nobile v. Woodward, 200 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
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weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of differing
proposals. .
. Inevitably differences arise in the manner and
degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect
individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete
satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected.
A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject
always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the
exercise of its discretion.
The breadth of the union's bargaining power has made impossible
the development of any generally applicable standards by which to determine whether it has breached its duty to represent fairly. The result
is, as stated by the Sixth Circuit in 1962, that the answer "depends
upon the facts of each case."' 0 In 1945, in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v.
Burley,3- the Supreme Court suggested that the union's power with
respect to the administration of the contract might not be as broad
as its power in negotiating the contract. The suggestion has not been
reflected in the decisions of the lower courts, and in spite of the criticism
of many commentators, the cases generally have upheld as wide a union
power in administration as in negotiation.
In light of the broad scope of the union's power, the courts have
been reluctant to equate distinctions with discriminations. In addition
to the mere fact of different treatment, they have required that plaintiffs offer affirmative evidence of bad faith. As put by the Second Circuit
in 1959: "it is not enough to prove that the union was wrong ...
This duty was no more than to forbear from 'hostile discrimination.'
The arbitrariness shown must be of the bad faith kind. . . . Something
akin to factual malice is necessary."' 2 Or, as stated by the Ninth Circuit in 1962: "An essential element . . . necessary to raise a limitation
upon a union's discretion . . . is a bad faith motive, an intent to hostilely discriminate. . . ...
3 Racial discrimination reflected in the contract
would doubtless meet this burden of proof. But when the alleged unfair
representation is non-racial and involves the administration of the contract, the burden is a difficult one to carry. Thus, the cases in which
10. Trotter v. Motor Coach Employees, 309 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
11. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
12. Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959).
13. Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1962).
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courts have upheld a complaint as stating a cause of action are far more
numerous than those holding that the union has violated its duty.
Other factors have contributed to prevent the duty of fair representation from being an efficacious doctrine. The psychological impediment against suing the union, the high costs of pursuing the claim through
the courts, and the inadequacy of the relief available have discouraged
frequent use of the doctrine. In the area of racial discrimination, where
breach of the duty is most easily demonstrated, Professor Sovern has
ascertained that: "The case reports reveal that Negroes have gone to
court to redress unfair representation on an average of less than once
a year since Steele was decided."'14 A study published just this summer
in the Maryland Law Review " has demonstrated the inadequacy of the
injunction remedy in the racial area of unfair representation. As to the
remedy of damages, the study states that: "In the twenty years since
the Steele decision, Negro plaintiffs have claimed upwards of $6,000,000
in compensatory and punitive damages. They have actually collected
$2,802 of the former and $3,000 of the latter." Another inadequacy has
been that where the unfair representation has resulted in discharge, the
union is unable to provide the appropriate remedy of reinstatement.
The judicial cause of action, created in cases arising under the
Railway Labor Act where no administrative remedy was available, was
carried over to cases arising under the NLRA. There the Board has
asserted since the Larus case in 194510 that a union which breached its
duty of fair representation by discriminating against Negroes was subject
to having its certification revoked. Aside from the fact that this was
more a threat than a pattern of decision, such a remedy would in any
event not amount to very much. It would certainly not be appropriate
to invoke it against a union representing a large number of employees
for a single breach of the duty. Furthermore, it would only affect certified
unions, and with strong majority unions, loss of certification would not
result in a loss of bargaining status. In 1962 in Pioneer Bus,17 the Board
announced that a contract which reflected racial discrimination would
not be a bar to representation proceedings, but again the rule is not a
14. Sovem, Race Discrimination and the National Labor .Relations Act: The
Brave New Yorld of Miranda, NYU SIxTEENTr ANNUAL CONFERENCE oN LABOR
(1963) at 3.
15. Herring, The "Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective Weapon
Against Union Racial Discrimination,24 MD. L. REv. 113 (1964).
16. Larus & Brother Co., 62 NLRB 1075 (1945).

17. Pioneer Bus Co., 140 NLRB 54 (1962).
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serious deterrent. Beyond these limited approaches in the area of its
jurisdiction in representation matters, the Board did not until very
recently assume any responsibility for enforcing the union's duty of fair
representation.
Professor Summers has said of the duty of fair representation that:
"experience has shown that it gives almost no protection to the
individual . . . it is almost without exception a form of words which
holds the promise to the ear and breaks it to the heart."' 8 In short, it
might be said that since its birth in 1944 the duty of fair representation
has been very much like a boy trying to do a man's job. Recent events
indicate, however, that by the time the duty reaches its majority, it may
be in a position to play a significant role in protecting employees against
unfair uses of union power.
A dramatic development occurred on December 19, 1962, when the
Board handed down its second decision in the case of Miranda Fuel
Co.,' " and brought the duty of fair representation within its unfair
labor practice jurisdiction. Briefly, the facts in Miranda were as follows.
The contract contained a provision authorizing leaves of absence without
loss of seniority between April 15 and October 15, with the condition
that any man failing to report back by October 15 should forfeit all
seniority rights. Lopuch was a truck driver whose seniority was eleventh
on a list of twenty-one. In early April 1957, he obtained company permission to leave at the close of business on Friday, April 12, to spend
the summer on family business. He told the company he would return
by October 12, but due to illness, did not return to work until October
30. Shortly after his return, the union demanded that Lopuch be reduced
to the bottom of the seniority list for late return. On learning of his
illness, the union abandoned this basis and instead demanded his reduction
in seniority because of his early departure. The company reluctantly acquiesced in this demand.
0
The Board's first decision in Miranda"
in 1959 held that the union
had violated 8(b)(2) and the company 8(a)(3). These two unfair
labor practices are related and an essential element of their joint violation
is that the discrimination encourage or discourage membership in a
union. Applying its Pacific Intermountain Express doctrine, the Board
18. Summers, Individuai Righkts in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,

37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1962) n188.
19. 140 NLRB 181 (1962).
20. 125 NLRB 454 (1959).
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held that the surrender to the union of the right to determine Lopuch's
seniority was a per se violation of both sections. After the Supreme
Court rejected the per se approach in its 1961 decision in Teamsters
Local 357 decision, 21 Miranda was remanded to the Board for reconsideration, Without any further hearing, the Board made a new decision
on the original record. A three-member majority (Leedom, Rodgers and
Brown) again found violations of 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3), this time on
the theory that the reduction of Lopuch's seniority had the foreseeable
result of encouraging union membership, and since the reduction was not
based on any legitimate employer or union purpose, this foreseeable result
must have been the purpose within the meaning of the two sections.
The Board went further, however, and now held for the first time that
Section 7 includes the right of employees to be free from "unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment" by the union which would violate the
duty of fair representation derived from Section 9. A breach by the
union of its Section 9 duty violates a Section 7 right and therefore violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) and, if the employer participates, he violates
Section 8(a)(1). Lopuch's reduction was arbitrary and without legitimate purpose; it violated his right to fair and impartial treatment; therefore, Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(a)(1) were violated. McCulloch and
Fanning dissented from both of the majority holdings. The dissent noted
that the Section 7 fair representation theory had not been advanced,
argued or litigated in the case, and asserted that nothing in the legislative history of the Act or in Board or court authority supported such a
result. It might also have noted that this important and controversial
holding was completely unsupported by any discussion or argumentation
but was merely stated in ipse dixit fashion as though it were self-evident.
On appeal, recognizing the importance of the case, the AFL-CIO,
the UAW, the ACLU, and the NAACP submitted amicus briefs. Just
a year ago today, the Second Circuit denied enforcement, but the court
split three ways and a majority did not pass on the legitimacy of the
Board's new brainchild.2 2 Only Judge Medina rejected what he called
the "novel, if not quite revolutionary, theory"; he also rejected the
8(b)(2)-8(a)(3) holdings for the reason that the evidence did not support a finding of encouragement of union membership. Judge Lombard
concurred in the latter view; he thought it was not necessary to decide
21. 'Local 357, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
22. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1%3).
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whether Section 7 incorporates the duty of fair representation since he
thought the facts showed no breach of that duty. Judge Friendly took
no position on the Section 7 point; he would have enforced the 8(b)(2)8(a)(3) holdings, since he believed the evidence supported a finding of
encouragement of union membership.
The Board did not seek Supreme Court review in Miranda, for a
much better vehicle for establishing its theory was available. In August
1962 proceedings had been commenced against the Independent Metal
Workers Union representing employees at Hughes Tool Company in
Houston, Texas. The facts were as follows. Locals 1 and 2 of the Independent Metal Workers Union, certified as joint bargaining representatives,
were racially segregated. The contract - provided for Group I jobs open
only to white employees, and Group II jobs open only to Negroes, with
separate lines of progression and demotion that prevented transfer from
one group to another. Local 2 wanted to negotiate for the elimination
of the racial discrimination, but Local 1 did not agree. In December 1961
the company and Local 1, over the protest of Local 2, extended the
contract. The company and Local 1 also agreed to create new apprenticeships in the plant, and in February 1962 they were posted for bids.
Davis, a Negro employed since 1942 and treasurer of Local 2, bid for
an apprenticeship. The company refused to include his name on the
list of applicants, notwithstanding protest by Local 2's grievance committee. Davis' request to Group 2 to intercede for him was ignored. A
charge was filed upon which complaint issued alleging violation of Section
8(b) (1) (A). Local 2 also filed a motion to rescind the 1961 certification.
The two cases were consolidated.
In March 1963 the trial examiner rendered his decision recommending that Local 1 be decertified and holding that it had violated 8 (b)(1)(A).
Relying upon Miranda, the examiner held that the union's refusal to
process Davis' grievance was to that extent a refusal to represent him,
and this refusal violated Davis' Section 7 right to have the union represent him fairly. Although the complaint had alleged only a violation of
8(b)(1)(A) and that was all that had been argued, the examiner held,
again relying upon Miranda, that the union had also violated 8(b)(2)
since its failure to process the grievance was for an arbitrary or irrelevant
reason or on the basis of an unfair classification and that union membership is encouraged or discouraged whenever a union causes an employer
to affect an individual's employment status. Finally, for good measure,
the examiner held that the union had also violated its Section 8(b)(3)

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1965], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

duty to bargain collectively. The reasoning here was that the duty to
bargain is owed not only to employers, but also to employees, since the
union has the duty to represent them fairly, and, since grievance processing is a part of bargaining, QED.
The Board affirmed the trial examiner's decision on July 1, 1964.23
All five members agreed that the union had violated 8(b)(1)(A). Three
members (Leedom, Brown and Jenkins who had succeeded Rodgers)
based the holding on the Miranda Section 7 fair representation theory,
from which McCulloch and Fanning dissented as they had in Miranda.
By the same 3 to 2 division the examiner's 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) holdings were upheld. The majority opinion adds nothing to that of the
examiner on the 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) violations, and not much more
than that on the 8(b)(1)(A). The dissent protested against the procedural impropriety of making 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3) findings in a proceeding where only 8(b)(1)(A) was in issue during the hearing, and
thought that the vice was not cured by the examiner's advising the
parties at the close of the hearing that he might pass on these issues
and inviting them to brief the points. The dissent is most significant by
reason of the strong argument advanced against the majority's Section 7
right of fair representation theory.
24
In September 1964 the Board again applied the Miranda theory.
At Brownsville, Texas, the ILA maintained all white and all Negro
locals. The contracts with employers' associations in the South Atlantic
and Gulf Coast areas provided for dividing the work between the two
locals on a 75-25 per cent basis. You can guess which got the short end.
Arrangement was also made which precluded white and Negro gangs
from working side by side in the same hatch. The same majority as in
Hughes Tool (Leedom, Brown and Jenkins) found that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation and had therefore violated
8(b)(1)(A), 8(b)(2) and 8(b)(3). The majority noted that the Second
Circuit had denied enforcement in Miranda but declared "with due deference" their adherence until such time as the Supreme Court rules otherwise. The majority then went on to elaborate on the 8(b)(3) theory.
Because collective-bargaining agreements which discriminate invidiously are not lawful under the Act, the good-faith requirements of
23. Metal Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.), 56 LRRM 1289 (1964).
24. Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n (Galveston Maritime Ass'n,
Inc.), 57 LRRM 1083 (1964).
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Section 8(d) necessarily protect employees from infringement of
their rights; and both unions and employers are enjoined by the
Act from entering into contractual terms which offend such rights.
... Section 8(d) cannot mean that a union can be exercising good
faith toward an employer while simultaneously acting in bad faith
toward employees in regard to the same matters ....
We conclude
that when a statutory representative negotiates a contract in
breach of the duty which it owes to employees to represent all of
them fairly and without invidious discrimination, the representative cannot be said to have negotiated the sort of agreement
envisioned by Section 8(d) nor to have bargained in good faith
as to the employees it represents or toward the employer.24a
McCulloch and Fanning again dissented from the majority approach,
although they found other reasons for concurring in the 8(b)(1) (A) and
8(b)(3) holdings.
Just a month ago, the Miranda-H-zghes Tool theory was again applied
by a majority of a three-member panel in a case in Chicago involving
the Auto Workers. 25 The employer absorbed a tool and die shop into
his general maintenance department, and at the insistence of the union,
the six tool and die employees were given a new seniority date for layoff
and recall as of the date of the transfer, thus causing them to lose their
tool and die seniority of from 15 to 21 years. This case had a reverse
twist, for the tool and die department had long been lily-white, whereas
the unit into which it was merged was mainly composed of Negro members and officers. Three members of the panel found violations of 8(b) (1) (A)
and 8(b)(2), but for different reasons. Leedom and Jenkins relied on
the Miranda-ITHghes Tool doctrine. Leedom thought that the union had
discriminated against the tool and die employees because they were
white. Jenkins wouldn't admit this, but instead thought that the union
was trying to redress the seniority advantage which existed because tool
and die had been all white for so long; he considered this to be an invidious, irrelevant and unfair consideration within the Miranda-Hugles
Tool doctrine. McCulloch rested his holding on the premise that the
union was motivated by union considerations and expressly noted his
disagreement with Miranda and Hughes Tool. All three members held
that by acquiescing in the union demand, the employer bad violated
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).
24a. Id at 1085-86.
25. Automobile Workers Union (Maremont Corp.), 57 LRRM 1298 (1964).
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The main thrust of the Board dissenters McCulloch and Fanning
is that the majority theory does not reflect the intent of Congress.
Sections 7 and 9(a) have been in the statute since 1935. But the Wagner Act did not make any union conduct unlawful and the duty of fair
representation was not judicially recognized until 1944. Although the
Steele and Wallace cases were well known, the legislative history of the
1947 amendments contains no mention of the duty. And although there
had been further decisions and articles by 1959, Congress again ignored
the duty of fair representation, although it did amehd the unfair labor
practice section and it did enact a Bill of Rights of union members.
On policy grounds, the dissenters argue that, under the majority
doctrine,
Inevitably, the Board will have to sit in judgment on the substantive matters of collective bargaining, the very thing the Supreme Court has said the Board must not do, and in which it
has no special experience or competence ....

Miranda means that

the Board is embarking on a wholly new field of activity for which
it has had no preparation, and which is likely seriously to interfere
with its present activities that are already more than enough to
keep it fully occupied.

2

5a

To these arguments of the dissent the following might be added.
Congress did in 1947 enact 8(b)(2). At the very least this section prohibits a union from causing an employer to discriminate against an
employee because he is not a member of the union. Such conduct would
clearly violate the duty of fair representation, and under the Board theory
would violate 8(b)(1)(A) as an interference with the Section 7 fight
to be fairly represented. If the Board's theory is correct, then 8(b)(2)
is reduced to surplusage so far as discrimination against non-union employees is concerned.
It might also be pointed out that the power now assumed by the
Board was in 1952 expressly repudiated. In an amicus brief filed in
the Board discussed the matter at some
Ford Motor Co. v. Hitffn,
length and concluded that its unfair labor practice jurisdiction did not
extend to the duty of fair representation. This brief expressly considered and rejected Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3) as appropriate for
dealing with the subject. The only administrative remedy claimed by
the Board was through the certification power.
In 1957, when Professor Cox published his article on fair represen25a. Supra note 23 at 1299-1300.
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tation,26 he considered the possibility of enforcing it through unfair
labor practice proceedings. His discussion makes no reference to 8(b)(1)
(A), but he does argue that breach of the duty should be a violation of
the 8(b)(3) duty to bargain collectively, as that is defined in Section
8(d). In April 1962, eight months before Miranda was decided, Professor Sovern published a much-cited article, "The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination."27 I think it is fair to say that in
this article Professor Sovern was advancing every tenable construction
possible under the NLRA which could be used against racial discrimination. "Unhappily," he wrote, "section 7 says nothing about the right
to be represented fairly." He called attention in a note to the position
taken by the Board in its brief in the Huffmnan case, but offered no disagreement with it. He did, however, take issue with Cox on the 8(b)(3)
position, stating that "The duty to bargain collectively probably does
not include the duty to represent fairly."
In June of 1963, in an article in Michigan Law Review,28 Professor
Blumrosen strongly defended Miranda as a case which should evoke
warm support from anyone interested in maximizing individual rights
in the collective bargaining process. He finds no reason to doubt that the
Board has the statutory power to enforce the duty of fair representation.
He argues that the statute was written in broad language to permit the
Board to come to grips with a variety of attempted limitations on employee rights. "To confine NLRB to the consideration of problems explicit
at the time of formulation of the national labor policy [that is, in 1935]
would not be consistent with previous decisions of the Supreme Court
which have stressed the breadth of power vested in the Board." On the
practical side, Blumrosen argues that "The concomitants of administration-the power to investigate, to urge informal settlement and to provide
an expeditious hearing, and the expertise of the personnel involvedall suggest that the NLRB is equipped to handle these problems more
speedily and more fairly than are the courts." To which might be added
that the Board also pays the expenses of litigation.
Miranda was also defended in June 1963 before the New York University Annual Conference on Labor by Professor Sovern.29 His argument
26. Cox, Th Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1957).
27. 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962).

28. Blumrosen, The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative
and Judicial Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 Micn. L. REV. 1435
(1963).
29. Supra note 14.
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essentially is that on policy grounds the result in Miranda is desirable,
and should be upheld if a plausible construction can be devised to support
it, and if it is not contrary to the intent of Congress. The plausible, or
at least ingenious, construction which had not occurred to him the year
before was now provided. I will not summarize it because my time is
running and also because I am not sure I understand it. As to the intent
of Congress, while Sovern concedes there is no evidence that Congress
intended any such result, neither is there any evidence that Congress
did not intend it. In fact, Congressional intent is non-existent, and therefore
may be disregarded as a factor. In short, the strongest argument in support
of the Board's Miranda theory is the policy argument that the duty of
the union and the right of the individual are clear, the judicial remedy
is highly inadequate, whereas an administrative remedy can give meaningful
enforcement and protection.
One of the current crop of racial discrimination cases poses a question
concerning the duty of fair representation which has never been resolved;
namely, does the union have an obligation to resist, on behalf of the
employees it represents, discrimination imposed by the employer? In a
dictum in a 1956 Fifth Circuit case 30 Judge Brown stated that the union
had an obligation "fully and earnestly to bargain to prevent and where
necessary remove, discrimination." In his 1957 article Professor Cox asserted
that the duty of fair representation does not impose upon unions "the
affirmative obligation of making reasonable efforts to abolish racial discrimination." Professor Sovem in his 1962 article argues that the union
does have, at least in certain situations, a duty to resist employer
discrimination.
In a case in Alabama involving the Rubber Workers, the employer
maintained racially segregated restrooms, showers and luncheon facilities,
and limited use of the plant golf course to whites. Negro employees urged
the union to seek elimination of the segregation. The union refused, and
in fact said it would resist any such change. The complaint alleged that
the union's refusal was a denial of fair representation and violated
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(3). Last spring the trial examiner refused to
so hold. He confined Miranda to the situation where the union takes
affirmative action against employees. The 8(b)(3) duty, he said, was
one owed primarily to the employer and it would be stretching the act
30. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Jones, 229 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
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unduly to hold that a union which refused to seek the eradication of
employer-imposed segregation had refused to bargain collectively. The
Board has not yet decided the case.3 1
All of the cases in which the Board has found racial discrimination
to be an unfair labor practice should be evaluated in light of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.32 This statute became law on July 2, one day after
the Board's decision in Hughes Tool. Title VII, which does not become
effective until July, 1965, deals with equal employment opportunity. Among
other things, Title VII identifies certain employer and union unlawful
employment practices, which are set forth in your manual. As I read
Section 703, it seems clear that the language is broad enough to embrace,
and I think was so intended, every instance of racial discrimination in
employment as far as the commerce power can reach it. Section 703
subsumes the duty of fair representation not only when race or color are
involved, but also religion, sex and national origin. It goes further than
the duty of fair representation in that it prohibits denial of union membership for the stated reasons. The remedy provided is federal or state
administrative conciliation, backed up by civil action in the federal
district courts.
The judicial remedy is stronger in several respects than that we discussed earlier in fair representation cases. The courts are authorized not
only to enjoin the respondent but also to "order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or hiring of
employees, with or without back pay," payable by the employer or the
union, as the case may be. I am sure you will note the similarity between
this language and that of Section 10(c) of the NLRB specifying the
remedial power of the Board. The court is also authorized to award
attorney's fees. Finally, the action may be brought by the Attorney General
if he has reasonable cause to believe that a pattern or practice of violation
exists.
It seems anomalous that Congress, having refused for so many years
to enact a fair employment practices act, should finally, after months
of consideration, enact such a statute specifying in great detail the remedial
procedures to be followed, then to find that the Board, applying language
31. The Board's decision was handed down on December 16, 1964, five days

after this paper was given. The Board held that the union had violated sections
8(b) (1) (A), 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (3). Rubber Workers Union (Business League
of Gadsden), 57 LRRM 1535 (1964).

32. Public Law 88-352; 78 Stat. 241.
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which admittedly was never intended to cover the problem area, is now
offering its own different remedy in many of the same situations dealt
with specifically by Congress. Notwithstanding the anomaly, the general
counsel of the NAACP, one of the principal groups advocating the Civil
Rights Acts, hailed the Board's decision in Hughes Tool as "a most significant breakthrough . . . of almost revolutionary proportions," adding
that NLRB procedures "would be easier, less costly to the individual, and
more widely applicable than the fair employment provisions of the Civil
Rights Act."33 One has to acknowledge respect for the Board. It is not
a small thing to make an act of Congress obsolete a year and a day before
it becomes effective.
Another development of significance in the area of fair representation
is the decision of the Supreme Court last January in the case of Humphrey
v.Moore.34 That case involved the Teamsters Union and two auto transport
companies. Both companies transported Ford cars and Ford ultimately
had need for only one of them. The two companies then worked out a
new territorial arrangement under which Company X took the area in
question. The employees of both companies were represented by the same
union. Since X did not need all of the employees of both companies a
question arose as to the proper allocation of jobs among present employees.
Ultimately it was agreed that the seniority of the two sets of employees
would be integrated. It turned out that Company Y was the older company
so that X ended up with a work force constituted largely of Y's men.
The individuals who had formerly been employed by X then protested
that the union and the company had exceeded their contractual powers
in making such an agreement, and that in any event the union had unfairly
discriminated against some of its members. The Supreme Court denied
both allegations. I should like to call attention to several points of interest
in connection with the Humphrey case.
First, there is the implication that an alleged breach of the union's
duty of fair representation states a cause of action under Section 301.
Justice Goldberg addressed himself to this in his dissent, denying such
jurisdiction on the ground that the duty of fair representation is "derived
not from the collective bargaining contract but implied from the union's
rights and responsibilities conferred by federal labor statutes." And so it
has always been assumed. Two causes of action were stated in Humphrey,
33. 56 LRR ANALYSIs 37 (July 6, 1964).
34. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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one for breach of Section 5 of the contract and the other for breach of
the duty of fair representation. Hvmplrey might be interpreted to mean
that where a cause of action otherwise is alleged under 301, then the fair
representation issue may also be litigated, in the nature of ancillary jurisdiction. Or Humpkrey might be interpreted to mean that 301 includes
the fair representation claim when it is alleged that such unfair representation has resulted in a breach of the contract. But the validity of
these interpretations is substantially vitiated by a footnote to the Court's
opinion which stated that "Even in the absence of Section 5, however, it
would be necessary to deal with the alleged breach of the union's duty of
fair representation." The test situation will be when an individual employee
seeks to bring a 301 action against the union without alleging any other
contract breach and without joining the employer. Justice White's opinion
is sufficiently opaque, and I suppose intentionally so, that the Court has
not boxed itself in.
One may ask at this point what difference it makes whether the
court has jurisdiction of the unfair representation claim under 301 or,
as it always has in the past, under the rationale of Steele and its progeny.
The answer, I think, may be found in the preemption doctrine. In Steele
the Court gave judicial relief because there was no administrative remedy
under the Railway Labor Act, and the result was followed under the
NLRA. If the duty of fair representation is derived solely from the NLRA,
and if the Board's Miraida-Iugles Tool doctrine is upheld, then arguably
the Board's jurisdiction would be exclusive under the rule of the Garmnon
case. 85 On the other hand, if the duty to represent fairly can be derived
from the contract, the courts would retain their 301 jurisdiction. Here is
the way Justice White put it in Hvmptrey:
Although there are differing views on whether a violation of the
duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice under the
Labor Management Relations Act, it is not necessary for us to
resolve that difference here. Even if it is, or arguably may be,
an unfair labor practice, the complaint here alleged that Moore's
discharge would violate the contract and was therefore within the
cognizance of federal and state courts, Smith v. Evening News
Association, subject, of course, to the applicable federal law.3a
Another aspect of Hwmpkrey which is of passing interest is the express
repudiation by the Court of the view expressed by the Kentucky Court
35. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 230 (1959).
35a. Supra note 34 at 344.
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of Appeals in that case, and in another case by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.'0 Under that view, a union automatically breaches its duty when
it represents two groups of employees having antagonistic interests. Certainly this view was not compatible with the realities of the bargaining
process, and the Court rejected it largely on the basis of its Haffmean
decision.
The Court did add at this point a discussion of considerable potential
importance. It considered the question whether the losing group of employees was deprived of a fair hearing by having inadequate representation
at the hearing which led to the settlement. The facts showed that three
stewards representing the losing group went to the hearing at union expense
and were given every opportunity to state their position. Justice White
said that the losing group "made no request to continue the hearing until
they could secure further representation and have not yet suggested what
they could have added to the hearing by way of facts or theory if they
had been differently represented." In the Steele case the Supreme Court
stated that as part of its duty to represent fairly, "the union is required
to consider requests of non-union members of the craft and expressions
of their views with respect to collective bargaining with the employer
and to give them notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed
action." In Humphrey, the Court seems to be suggesting that the same
is generally true where there are divergent group interests within the
bargaining unit, and logically, the point could be extended to an individual
interest. The significance lies in the historically demonstrated fact that
in any legal context unjust substantive results are less likely to ensue
when fair and open procedures are followed. It is worth noting that Justice
Goldberg rejected the idea that what he called "trial-type hearing standards"
should be applied so as to hinder the employer and the union.
In my few remaining minutes I should like to make a few remarks
by way of summary evaluation.
1. Unfair representation by unions has occurred principally because
of non-membership in the union and because of race. The former has
been prohibited since 1947 by 8(b)(2) and Congress in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 has provided a meaningful remedy for the latter. It may
also be anticipated that the prohibition against exclusion of Negroes from
union membership will reduce the frequency of racial discrimination.
36. Clark v. Hein-Warner Corp., 8 Wis.2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959),
rekearing denied, 100 N.W.2d 317 (1960).
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2. Aside from non-membership and race, the formulation of standards
and the identification of unfair representation present problems of such
complexity and difficulty that a strong practical case can be made for
use of the administrative process for their resolution. But conceding the
desirability of the policy result, I have serious doubt as to the propriety
of the Board's assumption of power in Miranda and Hughes Tool and also
the legal logic upon which those cases rest. We all know, however, that
ours is an age in which increasingly policy becomes law through the
instrument of administrative and judicial power. We know that the willingness of agencies and courts to use their power creatively is affected largely
by the fact that there are no ready answers to many of the tough problems
which come before these tribunals. Whatever may be said of many of our
agency members and federal judges and especially our Supreme Court
justices, they are not bashful in the use of their power. Professor Sovern,
taking his cue from Shakespeare's "Tempest" called his paper last year
"The Brave New World of Miranda." With the NLRB and the federal
courts in mind, what Miranda said is not inappropriate. "0 brave new
world, that has such people in it." And so, although it seems strained
and far-fetched to me, I am not prepared to predict that the MirandaHughes Tool doctrine will not eventually be upheld.
3. If it is upheld, it seems doubtful to me that the preemption doctrine
will be applied. I think the Civil Rights Act and the Humphrey case point
in the other direction. Indeed, I think it might be argued that the Civil
Rights Act has preempted the matter so as to make its remedies and
procedures exclusive where the unfair representation is based on race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
4. But whether the remedy is judicial or administrative or both, in
my judgment the duty of fair representation is not an adequate protection
of the interests of the individual employee under a collective bargaining
contract. The fair representation doctrine can do no more than protect
the individual against the bad faith exercise of power. I think what the
individual needs and what the law should provide, at least in some instances,
is an opportunity to have his claimed right under the contract determined
on its merits, even when the union and the employer are acting in admitted
good faith.
5. Finally, I think we should keep in mind that we are talking about
a problem which is not important because of any quantitative factor. We
would all admit, I think, that in the overwhelming majority of instances
the union represents the employees fairly and honestly, with results that
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are usually acceptable to the employees involved. It is not the frequency
of cases in which an individual employee's rights are violated which makes
the problem important. Rather, it is the qualitative value which our
law attaches to the individual human being and his rights in a society
which through so many forces, some impersonal and some surely personal,
increasingly threatens to submerge the individual. Whether the importance
of the individual and his rights can survive in the automated, overpopulated
society of the future is doubtful no matter how strong a fight we put up.
But if no effort is made the result is certain. It is in this perspective that
we lawyers should consider the problem which is common both to Mr.
37
Dunau's topic and to mine.

37. Mr. Bernard Dunau of Washington, D. C., delivered a paper entitled

Thndividu4l vs. Collective Rights under a Collective Bargaining Agreement.
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